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中國的資訊與通訊科技業，目前由少數企業主導，例如中興通訊、華為，和最近在硬體方面表現亮眼的小米，但未受反壟斷法影響。（圖／達志影像）

米。中國的電信業也由中國移動和中國聯通 有在這個產業推行反壟斷措施。這些資訊告
主導，雖然中國政府近年來以修訂外商投資 訴我們，其實中國政府決定加強反壟斷措

法之類的方式降低了外商參與的門檻，但外 施，有可能是為了加強控制主導新市場的關
商的參與幅度依然高度受限，而且中國也沒 鍵私人企業，尤其是金融科技和網路業。中

renewed liberalization measures like the foreign reality is President Xi’s push for better income
investment law, where no antitrust measures have distribution through the achievement of so called
been announced so far. Against this backdrop, a more ‘Common Prosperity’. In the crackdown on the

subtle – but possibly relevant – explanation of Chinese education sector, the link with ‘common prosperity’
policy makers’ decision to step up antitrust measures is quite obvious. In fact, access to private education
is to increase state control over key private actors is one of the main reasons for worsening income
dominating new markets, especially in the fintech and inequality, especially among young people. The
digital space. Chinese leaders could consider this all third crackdown is in the real estate sector, which is
the more necessary given these sectors’ economies of possibly the most important contributor to worsening
scale and network externalities but, most importantly, income inequality due to the rapid growth in
the data which can be accumulated about consumer house prices sustained over many years. Housing
preferences and beyond. affordability has continued to worsen and access to

housing, or the lack thereof, has long been a key
Common prosperity as an additional factor in explaining income disparity. The unrelenting
reason for the regulatory crackdown increase in housing prices stems from the lack of
investment opportunities for Chinese households in
One of the key traits of China’s post pandemic a financial system with little choice and no access

台灣銀行家2022.3月號 49

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